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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently killed one of the largest private-employer
civil rights class actions in American history, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes.1 After a decade of litigation, the case ended before it even began.
Former and current female employees brought a class action against WalMart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart), on behalf of roughly 1.5 million women,
alleging nationwide gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The plaintiffs contended that Wal-Mart gives its
local managers undue discretion when making pay and promotion
decisions, resulting in women being underpaid and disproportionately
denied promotions. They argued that there is ―a strong and uniform
‗corporate culture‘‖ that permits gender stereotyping, and bias to taint,
perhaps subconsciously, personnel decisions made throughout the
company.3
The plaintiffs‘ complaint relied on both disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories of discrimination. ―Disparate impact‖ occurs when there
is a neutral policy that has an adverse impact on a protected class of
workers, such as women. ―Disparate treatment‖ occurs when an employer
intentionally treats a class of employees adversely because of their
membership in a protected class. The Dukes plaintiffs contended that the
company knew about the disparate impact its practices were having on its
female employees and failed to do anything about it—amounting to
intentional discrimination.4 The class representatives sought an injunction,
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and back pay. The Court did not
*
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1
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2
Id. at 2547 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–1 to 2000e–17 (2006)).
3
Id. at 2548; id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court considered methods
used by Wal-Mart to ―maintain a ‗carefully constructed . . . corporate culture,‘ such as frequent meetings
to reinforce the common way of thinking, regular transfers of managers between stores to ensure
uniformity throughout the company,‖ and closely monitoring stores on a constant basis).
4
Id. at 2548.
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decide the merits of the case—i.e., whether in fact Wal-Mart discriminated
against its female employees. Rather, the Court concluded that the case
failed to meet the requirements of a class action, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit‘s en banc decision to affirm the district court‘s certification.5
The Court‘s opinion—while silent on the actual merits of whether
there is systemic gender discrimination at Wal-Mart—is a major blow to the
plaintiffs‘ case because of the unique and powerful role of a class action.
There is strength in numbers, especially when that number is 1.5 million.
But there is also strength in due process, especially when there are billions
of dollars at stake and the defendant that is being accused of massive
wrongdoing is one of the largest companies in the world. The Dukes
decision is important because it attempts to draw a boundary line. On the
one hand, the class action is a procedural asset that promotes efficiency and
court access—enabling plaintiffs with small claims and resources to jointly
challenge widespread misconduct in a single suit. On the other hand, the
class action is a procedural anomaly that is granted only under limited
circumstances—enabling defendants to adequately defend themselves and
class members to bring separate cases when their individual interests
diverge. This Essay contends that the Court drew a boundary line that
favors large, powerful employers over everyday workers alleging systemic
discrimination.
A class action is ―an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.‖6
Because a representative action runs counter to this fundamental principle,
the legislature and judicial system have established rigorous criteria to
ensure that departure from the norm is justified. The federal class action
rule—Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—sets out the
requirements for when a party can represent others so that efficiency and
due process are served. The courts must conduct a rigorous analysis to
make certain the Rule‘s requirements are met.7
For a case to be certified as a class action, all of the Rule 23(a)
provisions and one of the Rule 23(b) provisions must be met. Rule 23(a)
requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.8 Cases certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) are
mandatory class actions, in which class members are not required to receive
notice and an opportunity to exclude themselves from the litigation.9 The
5

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (link).
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) (link).
7
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (link).
8
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (link). Rule 23(a) is satisfied when: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder would be impracticable; (2) the class shares common questions of law or fact; (3) the
representative parties‘ claims or defenses are typical of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately represent the class. Id.
9
See id. 23(c)(2)–(3).
6
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class members are bound by a court judgment they may not have known
about, much less consented to. This extraordinary situation is justified by
the class‘s homogeneity and cohesiveness. Rule 23(b)(1) allows a class
action when there is a risk that, in the absence of a class action: (a) the party
opposing the class will be subject to inconsistent obligations, or (b) as a
practical matter, piecemeal litigation of individual class members will
impair the interests of other class members who are not parties to the
individual lawsuits,10 as is the case in a trust fund. Rule 23(b)(2) permits a
class action when there is class-wide conduct that makes ―final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief‖ appropriate for the whole class,11
as is the case for many civil rights claims. Alternatively, a class action
brought under Rule 23(b)(3)—the ―catch-all‖ provision—requires that class
members be provided notice and the right to opt-out12 because the
connection between the class is not nearly as strong. A Rule 23(b)(3)
class—the most common type—is permitted when common questions
predominate over individual ones and a class action is superior to other
methods of resolving a dispute.13
One of the challenges to aggregate litigation is determining what due
process is required when claims for monetary relief are involved. When
seeking back pay or monetary damages, class members‘ interests may
diverge, thereby breaking down the homogeneity and cohesion that usually
make notice and opt-out rights unnecessary. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids deprivation of ―life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.‖14 Therefore, a court must be careful
not to deprive class members of their property—i.e., money—when
requiring them to be in a mandatory class action. As the Supreme Court
stated in dicta in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the ―inherent tension between
representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied
to damages claims gathered in a mandatory class‖ because the ―legal rights
of absent class members . . . are resolved regardless of either their consent,
or . . . their express wish to the contrary.‖15 When certifying a class action,
a court must also be careful not to deprive a defendant of due process. A
defendant must be able to adequately defend itself from individual claims
whose aggregation may mask important distinctions and available defenses.
With such safeguards in place, the class action device plays a critical
role in the American civil justice system. Not only does aggregate litigation
save judges and parties substantial time and cost by resolving similar claims
all at once, it also promotes law enforcement. For many employees and
10
11
12
13
14
15

See id. 23(b)(1).
See id. 23(b)(2).
See id. 23(c)(2)(B).
See id. 23(b)(3).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend XIV, § 1 (link).
527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (link).
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others, a class action is their only meaningful access to the courts. Those
with small claims and limited resources are unlikely to challenge powerful
corporations on their own, effectively immunizing companies from
complying with the law.16 Individually, the litigation costs and attorney‘s
fees may exceed the value of the recovery—i.e., a negative-value suit—
resulting in employees forgoing litigation. Collectively, employees can
share the risks and burdens of litigation and pool their resources, making it
economically feasible to challenge misconduct in court.17 Even if
individuals are able to seek redress for individual harms, they cannot
effectively challenge widespread misconduct in the absence of collective
action. While individual cases may motivate employers to change their
relevant policies and practices to avoid similar suits in the future, this pales
in comparison to the remedies and scope of injunctive relief plaintiffs can
craft in class actions. And government agencies—burdened by budgetary
and political constraints—often cannot fill the gap left by the lack of private
enforcement. Not insignificantly, employers also enjoy the efficiency and
global peace that class settlements often provide. Thus, class certification
should be demanding, but not so demanding that it compromises the
numerous advantages aggregate litigation has to offer.
The Dukes class certification standard jeopardizes potentially
meritorious challenges to systemic discrimination. By redefining the class
certification requirements for employment discrimination cases in two
major areas, discussed below, the Court compromises employees‘ access to
justice.
I.
COMMONALITY
At the outset, the Dukes majority decertified the class by determining
that there was not enough glue to hold the case together as a class action.18
Under Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification must demonstrate that
there is enough in common between the class representatives and members
of the class to justify aggregate litigation. In the other words, there must be
―questions of law or fact common to the class.‖19 In a 5–4 decision written
16
See Carnegie v. Household Int‘l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (―The
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.‖).
17
Title VII employment discrimination cases may also be negative-value suits, despite the fact that
their claims are not de minimis—as is often the case in consumer actions. See Suzette M. Malveaux,
Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions Alive: How Allison v. Citgo’s
Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 405, 429 (2005) (―Even if plaintiffs may have a greater incentive to pursue their individual
claims because of Title VII‘s $300,000 damage cap, plaintiffs are not able to spread the costs of
litigation as class members would be able to in the class action context.‖).
18
See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011).
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). A federal class action must meet the other criteria under Rule 23(a) as
discussed in the Introduction of this Essay.
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by Justice Scalia, the conservative majority raised the bar for
commonality—arguably one of the easiest class action thresholds.
Conceding that all it takes is a single common question to satisfy the
requirement, the Court concluded that this criterion was not met.20
Not surprisingly, the Court appropriately reiterated that the class
certification standard is tough. A judge must rigorously analyze whether a
case should be a class action, including deciding merits issues if they
overlap with class certification.21 And the party moving for class
certification must actually prove that the Rule 23 requirements are met.22
But what was surprising was the Court‘s further step—requiring the WalMart plaintiffs to prove, with significant evidence, that there exists a
general policy of discrimination as a condition of class certification.23
Deconstructing the term ―question‖ in Rule 23(a)(2), the majority
concluded that it was not enough for plaintiffs to pose the question of
whether there was a pattern or practice of discrimination to satisfy
commonality. Now plaintiffs must know the answer.24
As stated in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, there is
a wide gap between an individual case and a class action.25 Dukes aptly
observed this fact.26 Just because an individual woman may have
experienced gender discrimination at work does not mean that a class of
women has experienced the same. But Dukes widened the gap. Relying on
dicta in footnote fifteen of the Falcon decision, the Court required the
plaintiffs to demonstrate commonality with ―‗significant proof‘ that WalMart ‗operated under a general policy of discrimination.‘‖27 This
interpretation of commonality goes beyond prior Title VII class action
jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit majority criticized its dissent for similar
reasons:
The dissent . . . seeks to create a new class action
requirement based on a hypothetical in one sentence of
Supreme Court dicta; conflates, or at least fails to
distinguish, the posture of Falcon and the present case;
20

See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57.
Id. at 2551–52.
22
Id. at 2551.
23
Id. at 2553–56 & n.9.
24
See id. at 2552.
25
457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982). Falcon involved a lead plaintiff who alleged discrimination
against Mexican-Americans. He alleged that he and a class of Mexican-American employees were
subjected to intentional discrimination in promotions and that a class of Mexican-American applicants
was subjected to disparate impact discrimination in hiring. Id. at 162 (Burger, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Court found that there were no common questions between the plaintiff and the
applicant class. Id. at 157–58 (majority opinion).
26
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15).
27
Id.
21
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[and] ignores the weight of the many cases in other circuits
arriving at the same [class certification] standard we have
described . . . .28
Dukes states that class members must each suffer the ―same injury‖
rather than the same Title VII violation.29 The level of generality at which
―injury‖ is defined is critical. Tellingly, Dukes further explains that ―[t]heir
claims must depend upon a common contention,‖ such as ―discriminatory
bias on the part of the same supervisor.‖30 This exemplar suggests that the
level of generality is narrow. The common contention could just as well
have been discriminatory bias as a result of a policy of excessive
subjectivity—the issue in Dukes. As if it was not enough that the Court
unearthed and elevated the ―significant proof‖ standard for commonality
from a footnote in Falcon, the Court‘s application of this standard confirms
the formidable climb necessary to reach commonality in the future.
But the Court found that the evidence provided by the plaintiff class
did not satisfactorily establish a common claim of discriminatory bias. To
demonstrate commonality, plaintiffs proffered three types of evidence:
statistics showing gender disparities in pay and promotions; 120 affidavits
from female employees reporting discrimination; and testimony from a
sociologist, who concluded that Wal-Mart was vulnerable to gender
discrimination because of its corporate culture and personnel practices.31
At the outset, by analyzing each type of evidence in isolation to
determine whether it provided ―significant proof‖ of a general
discriminatory policy, the Court diminished the overall import of plaintiffs‘
evidence. Any one type of evidence—statistics, affidavits, or expert
testimony—by itself may fail to provide sufficient justification for
aggregate litigation. But the evidence in toto creates a clearer picture of the
common thread that holds the class together. The statistical disparity,
anecdotal accounts, and ―social framework‖ analysis, taken together,
provide the glue necessary to bind 1.5 million separate stories.
Disaggregation of the evidence, on the other hand, effectively disables a

28

603 F.3d 571, 594–95 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541. Moreover, the Court noted that:
Falcon‘s discussion of two distinct processes—hiring and promotion—for which
―significant proof‘‘ could prove sufficient to certify a single class, is an unusually
high standard that Plaintiffs here need not meet because they did not present the
distinct legal theories of recovery that the Falcon plaintiffs, both employees and
applicants, had pursued together in one class.

Id. at 595.
29
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 2549.
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judge from connecting the dots and seeing the commonality necessary for
class certification.
The Court gave each type of evidence short shrift. To the extent that
the Court credited the statistical proof showing a gender disparity, the Court
favored storewide statistics over regional and national ones.32 The 120
affidavits were viewed as a drop in the bucket in comparison to the size and
geographic dispersion of the class.33 And the sociologist‘s expert
testimony—the ―only evidence of a ‗general policy of discrimination‘‖
according to the Court34—was disregarded on the grounds that he could not
discern to what extent stereotyped thinking and bias influenced pay and
promotion decisions at Wal-Mart nationwide.35 Given the Court‘s analysis,
it is hard to imagine what type and quantity of evidence would satisfy the
new ―significant proof‖ standard for an employment discrimination case of
this scope and magnitude.
First, the Court concluded that national and regional statistics
demonstrating a gender disparity did not establish that plaintiffs‘ theory of
discrimination could be proved on a class-wide basis. Such statistics did
not necessarily reflect storewide disparities, upon which commonality
depended.36 Even if such statistical evidence demonstrated storewide
gender disparities, the Court concluded that this still would not establish a
common issue because each store manager would proffer a different
explanation for its shortfall.37 The Court claimed that merely proving that a
discretionary system resulted in a statistical disparity was insufficient to
demonstrate commonality, absent identification of a specific employment
practice.38 But precedent makes clear that an employer‘s ―undisciplined
system of subjective decisionmaking‖ is an ―employment practice‖ that
may give rise to Title VII claims under disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories.39 The Court was unsatisfied with this and concluded that
this employment practice was not enough to tie together the claims of the
class.40

32
Id. at 2555–56. There was a dispute over whether the plaintiffs‘ expert did, in fact, provide
storewide statistics. See id. at 2564 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33
Id. at 2556 & n.9 (―[W]hen the claim is that a company operates under a general policy of
discrimination, a few anecdotes selected from literally millions of employment decisions prove nothing
at all.‖).
34
Id. at 2553 (emphasis added).
35
Id. at 2553–54 (holding that the sociologist‘s testimony ―does nothing to advance [plaintiffs‘]
case‖ and concluding that ―we can safely disregard what he has to say‖).
36
Id. at 2555.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 2555–56 (emphasizing that ―[o]ther than the bare existence of delegated discretion‖ by
Wal-Mart, plaintiffs did not identify a specific employment practice).
39
Id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
657 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
See id. at 2554–55 (majority opinion).
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Second, plaintiffs‘ anecdotal evidence did not help clear the
commonality threshold. Despite sworn testimony of discrimination by over
a hundred employees in a half-dozen states, the Court concluded that this
evidence fell woefully short because of the sheer size and geographic
dispersion of the class.41 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, the Government, as plaintiff, produced forty affidavits from
individuals testifying about race discrimination, in support of the plaintiff‘s
allegation of company-wide discrimination.42 Dukes favorably cited
Teamsters for the fact that there was one anecdote for every eight class
members.43 Had the plaintiffs collected affidavits in the same proportion—
i.e., a one-to-eight ratio—they would have had to produce 187,500
affidavits for a class of 1.5 million members. This suggested proportion (or
one even in the ballpark) effectively ensures that no plaintiff will be able to
allege systemic discrimination by an employer the size of Wal-Mart using
anecdotal evidence. The most affluent class counsel cannot realistically
finance and staff a case requiring this kind of showing—even without
additional types of evidence—merely to cross the commonality threshold.44
Moreover, because the Court required plaintiffs to ―demonstrate that
the entire company ‗operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination,‘‖
to satisfy commonality,45 even if all 120 accounts of gender discrimination
were true, they were too weak to create an inference of class-wide
discrimination.46 The conflation of class certification and the pattern-orpractice liability criteria catapulted commonality to an unattainable level.
The amount of anecdotal evidence required to demonstrate commonality for
a class this large is effectively out of reach.
Finally, the Court concluded that even the ―only evidence of a general
policy of discrimination‖—expert testimony that Wal-Mart‘s discretionary
policy resulted in biased personnel decisionmaking—was ―worlds away‖
from meeting the ―significant proof‖ standard.47 First, the fact that WalMart‘s policy gave local supervisors unfettered discretion over employment
decisions called into question whether there was a uniform employment
41

Id. at 2555–57.
431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977) (link).
43
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977)).
44
With only 120 affidavits submitted, given the additional cost of experts, discovery, and attorney
time, lead counsel for plaintiffs spent $7 million on the case. Leigh Jones, U.S. Law Firm Spent $7
Million
to
Sue
Wal-Mart,
REUTERS.COM,
June
21,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE75K77C20110621 (link).
45
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 2553–54. The expert‘s testimony barely escaped analysis under the rigorous standard for
admission established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. See id. (citing 509 U.S. 579
(1993)). The district court concluded that the Daubert standard for admitting testimony of an expert
witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 did not apply at the class certification stage, and the
Supreme Court—although not deciding the issue—―doubt[ed]‖ this was so. Id.
42
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practice that could be challenged on a class-wide basis.48 The notion that
unchecked, local, subjective decisionmaking at 3,400 separate stores across
the country could provide the common thread for a single action is
admittedly counterintuitive. This is true, of course, if one focuses on the
trees rather than the forest. Commonality depends on the locus of analysis.
If the locus is the thousands of supervisors in the field, making myriad
decisions affecting 1.5 million separate employees, it is easy to conclude
that there is no common question whose resolution would decide the case.
But if the locus is the company—giving its agents the authority to make
biased employment decisions while looking the other way—it is easier to
see how the case can be resolved on a class-wide basis. By focusing on the
employer, the entity culpable under Title VII and the one responsible for
systemic harm,49 the uniform employment practice becomes apparent. The
various ways the discrimination plays out as a result of this practice is a red
herring,50 unnecessary to the threshold commonality determination under
Rule 23(a)(2).51
Furthermore, even assuming Wal-Mart operated an ―undisciplined
system of subjective decisionmaking‖ potentially actionable under Title
VII, the Court did not find that sufficient to meet the commonality test.52
This stems from the majority‘s skepticism, if not disbelief, that a majority
of Wal-Mart‘s managers might act—even subconsciously—in a way that
disfavors women‘s employment prospects.53 The Court stated, without
support, that ―left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—
and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.‖54 The Court insisted
that plaintiffs identify a ―common mode‖ of how supervisors exercise their
discretion throughout the company but then rejected the statistics,

48

Id. at 2554.
The employer cannot exhibit reckless indifference to the discriminatory impact its policies have
on its employees.
50
Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―Wal-Mart‘s delegation of discretion over pay and
promotions is a policy uniform throughout all stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will
exercise it in various ways. A system of delegated discretion . . . is a practice actionable under Title VII
when it produces discriminatory outcomes.‖).
51
The individual stories of alleged discrimination are relevant to a Rule 23(b)(3), where the court
must determine if common questions predominate over individual ones. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
The dissent correctly noted that the majority conflated the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3). See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (majority opinion) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988)).
53
See id.
54
Id. (emphasis added).
49
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affidavits, and expert evidence indicating that gender bias might be the
answer.55
The inability of plaintiffs‘ expert to discern to what extent gender bias
permeated supervisors‘ decisionmaking fueled the Court‘s skepticism. The
expert could not answer ―whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the
employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped
thinking.‖56 Because the Court insisted that the answer to this question—
rather than the question itself—was the basis for plaintiffs‘ commonality
theory, the Court found the sociologist‘s testimony useless.57 But the
answer to this ―essential question‖58 is not only unknown, but unknowable.
Given the subtle, complex and sometimes even unconscious nature of
modern discrimination, it would be practically impossible to determine with
any specificity how much gender bias infected the workplace.
The Court‘s skepticism was also bolstered by the fact that Wal-Mart
has an ―announced‖ policy forbidding gender discrimination.59 Juxtaposing
Wal-Mart‘s official non-discrimination policy with its policy of giving local
supervisors unfettered discretion to make employment decisions, the Court
was not persuaded that plaintiffs had provided ―significant proof‖ sufficient
to bridge the gap between an individual and class case.60 But surely the
mere presence of a written anti-discrimination policy should not be able to
destroy commonality in putative employment discrimination class actions.
Otherwise, all employers could bulletproof themselves from liability by
inserting boilerplate language into their employee handbooks. Given
contemporary societal attitudes about flagrant gender discrimination, one
would expect most employers to have official anti-discrimination
statements in their personnel materials. It would be naïve to presume the
absence of gender bias in the workplace because of such a statement.
Moreover, the statement would have no bearing in disparate impact cases,
where plaintiffs need not prove intent.
In contrast, the dissent—comprised of all the female justices and
Justice Breyer—had no problem concluding that Wal-Mart‘s discretionary
policy may have resulted in systemic bias:
55

See id. at 2554–55 (―[Plaintiffs] have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion that
pervades the entire company—aside from their reliance on Dr. Bielby‘s social frameworks analysis that
we have rejected.‖). Additionally, the Court noted that ―[i]n a company of Wal-Mart‘s size and
geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a
common way without some common direction. [Plaintiffs] attempt to make that showing by means of
statistical and anecdotal evidence, but their evidence falls well short.‖ Id. at 2555.
56
Id. at 2553 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57
Id. at 2554.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 2553. The district court also recognized that Wal-Mart imposes penalties for equal
employment opportunity violations. Id.
60
Id.
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The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion to
make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal
standards, has long been known to have the potential to
produce disparate effects. Managers, like all humankind,
may be prey to biases of which they are unaware. The risk
of discrimination is heightened when those managers are
predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate
culture that perpetuates gender stereotypes.61
Finding no error of law or abuse of discretion, the dissent deferred to
the district court‘s findings indicating potential class-wide disparate impact
and disparate treatment gender discrimination. In finding sufficient
commonality, the district court relied on plaintiffs‘ evidence suggesting a
system of discretionary decisionmaking that operates uniformly across
stores, a corporate culture that suffuses gender bias, a company failure to
counter such bias, and pay and promotion disparities that ―can be explained
only by gender discrimination and not by . . . neutral variables.‖62
The implications of this close, highly controversial portion of the
Dukes opinion are varied. On the one hand, the Court‘s ruling may have
little impact on employment discrimination class actions. While the Court‘s
insistence that plaintiffs put forth more evidence to satisfy commonality
will likely discourage employees from bringing class actions of this
magnitude and scope, cases the size of Dukes are rare. With 1.5 million
potential class members nationwide, Dukes unquestionably tested the outer
bounds of what it takes to hold a class together. Smaller classes are bound
to be more successful.
On the other hand, the Court‘s ruling has the potential to cut short a
number of employment discrimination class actions premised on the theory
of excessive subjectivity as a discriminatory policy. Although Dukes has
received a lot of attention because of its extraordinary facts, it is not an
outlier when it comes to the plaintiffs‘ underlying theory of liability. The
reliance on Wal-Mart‘s discretionary policy as a vehicle for disparate
impact and disparate treatment discrimination litigation makes the case
prototypical, rather than exceptional.63
Consequently, to satisfy
commonality generally, judges may now require a stronger causal
connection between an employer‘s discretionary decisionmaking policy and

61
Id. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that ―[i]t is hardly surprising that for many
managers, the ideal candidate [is] someone with characteristics similar to their own‖).
62
Id. at 2562–64.
63
See id. at 2564–65.
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a disparity or adverse employment action.64 This shift will make it harder
for employees relying on this theory to act collectively.
II.
BACK PAY AND OTHER MONETARY RELIEF
The conservative majority decertified the class action by concluding
that there was not commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). Because a class action
cannot survive without commonality, the Court could have stopped there.
Indeed, the Court did refrain from ruling on any of the other Rule 23(a)
criteria for this very reason.65 Despite the majority‘s admission that going
any further was unnecessary, it decided that it was inappropriate for
plaintiffs to seek back pay under Rule 23(b)(2).
Like many employees challenging systemic discrimination, the Dukes
plaintiffs sought not only an injunction to curtail the company‘s allegedly
discriminatory policies and practices, but also back pay. Back pay
compensates employees for earnings they would have received in the
absence of discrimination.
Back pay not only makes victims of
discrimination ―whole.‖ More importantly, it encourages voluntary
compliance with the law. In enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Congress made clear that back pay, like injunctive and declaratory relief, is
essential to law enforcement.66 Because of the importance of back pay,
there is even a presumption in favor of it when discrimination is
established.67
The Court‘s unanimous conclusion that back pay was not appropriate
for the type of class action certified in Dukes was surprising. This
gratuitous decision effectively reversed almost a half-century of Title VII
jurisprudence permitting back pay under such circumstances. In the first
and only Title VII post-Dukes case to date, the federal district court
concluded: ―In so holding, a unanimous Supreme Court reduced to rubble
more than forty years of precedent in the Courts of Appeals, which had long
64

Moreover, to the extent that Dukes elevates the proof necessary to demonstrate commonality
under Rule 23(a)(2), this elevation may arguably apply to all class actions. See id. at 2565–66
(―Because Rule 23(a) is also a prerequisite for Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes, the Court‘s
‗dissimilarities‘ position is far reaching.‖).
65
Id. at 2551 n.5 (majority opinion) (―In light of our disposition of the commonality question . . . it
is unnecessary to resolve whether [plaintiffs] have satisfied the typicality and adequate-representation
requirements of Rule 23(a).‖).
66
See 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (remarks made by Sen. Williams in a section-by-section
analysis of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972); see also United States v. N.L. Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (describing the compensatory and deterrent functions of back
pay) (link).
67
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419–21 & n.12 (1975) (link); see also 1 JANICE
GOODMAN, MARY ANN OAKLEY, ALICE D. BONNER, EDITH BARNETT & SUZANNE SANGREE,
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION § 2.10[2][a][i] (2010) (―Back pay is the most common form of monetary
relief in Title VII cases . . . [and is] . . . routinely granted barring extraordinary circumstances.‖); id.
(―[T]he denial of back pay to prevailing plaintiffs is a minor exception rather than the rule.‖).
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held that backpay is recoverable in employment discrimination class actions
certified under Rule 23(b)(2).‖68 Courts have regularly permitted back pay
for civil rights cases under Rule 23(b)(2) on the grounds that this monetary
relief is equitable and critical to Title VII‘s remedial scheme.69 Even
appellate courts with the toughest class certification standards have
recognized that back pay is consistent with the Rule‘s strictures.70
Despite this history, the Court found the equitable nature of back pay
irrelevant71 and conditioned the availability of back pay on whether or not it
was incidental72 to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.73 The Court
concluded that Wal-Mart was entitled to have back pay determined
individually rather than formulaically, thereby making such relief nonincidental to the class-wide injunction.74
68
United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2011 WL 2680474, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 8,
2011); see 5 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 92.11[1] (2d ed. 2011) (citing cases to
support the assertion that ―the majority of courts have had little difficulty fitting an action for back pay
and injunctive relief into Rule 23(b)(2)‖).
69
City of New York, 2011 WL 2680474 at *7–8 & n.3; see, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases) (link); Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415–416 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (―Of course, to the extent the district
court applied an incidental damages standard to plaintiffs‘ claims for back pay, its analysis was
flawed.‖) (link); id. at 425 (―[W]e hold that nonequitable monetary relief may be obtained in a class
action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) only if the predominant relief sought is injunctive or declaratory.‖
(emphasis added)); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to WalMart v. Dukes, 5 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV., Mar. 21, 2011, http://hlpronline.com/2011/03/class-actionsat-the-crossroads/ (discussing same) (link).
70
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618–19 & n.40 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011) (citing cases adopting the ―consensus view‖ and noting that ―it is . . . well accepted, even
by circuits that are generally restrictive in certifying classes seeking monetary damages under Rule
23(b)(2), that a request for back pay in a Title VII case is fully compatible with the certification of a
Rule 23(b)(2) class‖); see also, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir.
2006) (―[W]e do not hold, nor have we ever held, that monetary relief is fundamentally incompatible
with Rule 23(b)(2).‖) (link); Allison, 151 F.3d 4 at 415 (concluding that Rule 23(b)(2) permits monetary
relief that is equitable, and ―[b]ack pay, of course, had long been recognized as an equitable remedy
under Title VII‖); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 404 F.2d 211, 257–58 (1974) (concluding that,
under the circumstances, ‗an award of back pay, as one element of the equitable remedy, conflicts in no
way with the limitations of Rule 23(b)(2)‘ (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th
Cir. 1971))) (link); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (―The
demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the
statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court‘s discretion, and not by a
jury.‖) (link).
71
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011).
72
The Court held that monetary relief may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where such relief is
not ―incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief.‖ Id. at 2557. The Court, however, refrained from
deciding if any forms of incidental monetary relief would be allowed. See id at 2560.
73
Although the Court never explicitly adopts the Fifth Circuit‘s ―incidental‖ test for determining
whether monetary relief is permitted under Rule 23(b)(2), which is set forth in Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., the Court subsequently applies its incidental test to plaintiffs‘ back pay claims, and
concludes that such relief is impermissible because it failed the test. See id. at 2560–61 (citing Allison,
151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)).
74
Id.
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The Court determined that back pay could not be calculated on an
aggregate basis (contrary to the approach taken by many courts75); rejected
the formulaic method proposed by the Dukes plaintiffs; and reiterated WalMart‘s right to raise individual affirmative defenses to each class member‘s
claim following a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination.76
Unlike Hilao v. Estate of Marcos—another Ninth Circuit decision, in which
the court allowed the defendant to present individual defenses to a random
sampling of cases used to extrapolate class-wide compensatory damages77—
Dukes disapproved of this ―novel project.‖78 The Court concluded that,
should back pay be calculated on the basis of ―Trial by Formula‖ rather
than through individualized hearings, Wal-Mart would lose its statutory
right to defend itself from individual claims in violation of Title VII. 79
Thus, it was the individualized—rather than the monetary—nature of back
pay that made it inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
Once Dukes concluded that back pay had to be calculated individually,
it was not a stretch for it to find such monetary relief non-incidental, and
thus inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification—at least under the
standard established by the Fifth Circuit in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp.80 This shift in Title VII jurisprudence is significant because of the
greater difficulty employees have in aggregating their monetary claims
under the alternative—Rule 23(b)(3).
Civil rights plaintiffs have
historically challenged systemic discrimination under Rule 23(b)(2), in part
to avoid the more onerous burdens and costs associated with this

75

See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 619 & n.41, rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011); Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418 (5th Cir. 2004) (link); Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d
443, 449–50 (6th Cir. 2002) (link); see also LARSON, supra note 68, § 92.11[3] (―It is sometimes
impractical, when a large class is involved, to calculate back pay for each member on an individual
basis. The approaches . . . adopted by . . . various circuits confirm that a court may . . . award . . . back
pay on a class-wide, rather than individual, basis.‖); id. (―[C]ourts generally have employed a class-wide
remedy when individual determinations are impracticable.‖).
76
The Supreme Court established a method for trying a pattern-or-practice case in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 360–62 (1977). The trial is divided into two
phases: liability and remedy. At the liability phase, plaintiffs have the burden of proving a pattern or
practice of discrimination. If plaintiffs meet this burden, this creates an inference that each class
member who suffered an adverse employment action was a victim of the discriminatory pattern or
practice. Id. at 360. At the remedy phase, the burden shifts to the defendant who has the opportunity to
prove otherwise. Id. at 360–61. Teamsters states that following a pattern or practice liability finding, ―a
district court must usually conduct additional proceedings . . . to determine the scope of individual
relief.‖ Id. at 361 (emphasis added). Teamsters, however, does not require such proceedings. See id. at
361–62.
77
103 F.3d 767, 782–87 (9th Cir. 1996) (link).
78
131 S. Ct. at 2561.
79
Id. It would also violate the Rules Enabling Act for the Court to interpret Rule 23 in a way that
would abridge the company‘s substantive rights. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
80
See 151 F.3d 402, 412–415 (5th Cir. 1998).
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alternative.81 Rule 23(b)(3) certification is available if common issues
predominate over individual ones and a class action is a superior
mechanism for resolving the dispute. Because this type of class action is
less cohesive and homogeneous than one brought under Rule 23(b)(2), class
members must be provided notice of the class action and an opportunity to
opt out of the action.82 Not surprisingly, if a court decides that back pay
must be calculated on an individualized basis, the court is more apt to
conclude that individual issues predominate over common ones, thereby
foreclosing Rule 23(b)(3) certification as well.83
But even in those jurisdictions where plaintiffs may be able to clear the
(b)(3)-certification hurdle under such circumstances, the cost of sending out
class notices—which can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars—may be
prohibitive.84
Consequently, between the heightened certification
requirement for Rule 23(b)(2) cases involving monetary relief, and the more
demanding burden and costs for Rule 23(b)(3) cases, some employees
alleging systemic discrimination may not be able to successfully bring a
class action at all. As class action expert, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.,
notes, this may be the most significant problem Dukes poses for future
employment discrimination cases:
The simple truth is that employment discrimination
litigation cannot normally be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)
because of the ―predominance‖ requirement of that
rule . . . . Even in a far simpler, more streamlined case than
[Dukes], there will still typically be a host of individual
issues that will make it difficult (and usually impossible) to
satisfy that predominance standard.
....
. . . [T]he liberal wing of the [C]ourt may not have
recognized how procedurally cut off and trapped
employment discrimination victims are if back pay cannot
be obtained as a form of ―incidental‖ relief under Rule
23(b)(2). Reinforcing this sense is the casual assertion by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her [Dukes] dissent that the
case should be remanded to the district court for a
determination as to whether it could be certified under Rule
23(b)(3). That idea is a non-starter. In all circuits, the
predominance standard has long been the Grim Reaper of
putative class actions, and the sprawling character of the
81
A class action may also be brought under Rule 23(b)(1), but this is inapplicable for most civil
rights actions.
82
See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 412–13.
83
See Malveaux, supra note 17, at 427.
84
Id. at 425–26.
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[Dukes] class . . . doomed it from the start—if the
predominance standard applied.85
The Court‘s unanimous decision to narrow the availability of back pay
to very limited circumstances under Rule 23(b)(2) alters the prospect of
Title VII claims being aggregated at all.
Moreover, what is interesting about Dukes is not only what the Court
decided, but what it did not. First, the Court did not answer one of the
questions for which it actually granted review: whether any monetary relief
is appropriate for a Rule 23(b)(2) action, which mentions only injunctive or
declaratory relief.86 Rule 23(b)(2) states that a class action is authorized
where ―the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.‖87 The Court recognized that one possible reading of the Rule
foreclosed monetary relief altogether—an interpretation the Court did not
adopt. While the Court did not go so far as to prohibit monetary relief, it
did not explicitly permit such relief either. Instead, it opted to prohibit
individualized relief—whether monetary, injunctive, or declaratory.88
Second, the Court surprisingly did not subscribe to any
―predominance‖ test when determining whether back pay should be allowed
under Rule 23(b)(2). All of the federal courts of appeals to have addressed
the question of whether monetary relief—more specifically, damages—is
allowed under the Rule have concluded that such relief is permitted so long
as it does not predominate.89 While Rule 23(b)(2) itself does not mention
anything about predominance, the Advisory Committee, which drafted the
rule, did. The Advisory Committee Notes plainly state that, so long as the
appropriate final relief does not relate ―exclusively or predominantly to
money damages,‖ Rule 23(b)(2) certification is proper.90 Because of the
Rule‘s silence on the matter, the circuit courts have uniformly relied on the
85

John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 80
U.S.L.W. 93 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
86
The question presented on petition for a writ of certiorari was ―[w]hether claims for monetary
relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its terms is limited to
injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief . . . .‖ Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (No. 10-277), 2010 WL 3355820, at *i.
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
88
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (―[A]t a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at
issue here) do not satisfy the Rule[23(b)(2)].‖). The Court relied on the text, history, and structure of
Rule 23 in coming to this conclusion. Id at 2557–59.
89
Malveaux, supra note 69; see, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 615–17
(2010); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on
the Advisory Committee‘s note); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411–415 (5th Cir.
1998) (same).
90
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee‘s note (link).
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Advisory Committee Notes for guidance. Their only disagreement has been
how predominance should be determined.91 The circuit courts are split,
creating three predominance tests: the Fifth Circuit‘s popular ―incidental‖
test,92 the Second Circuit‘s ad hoc balancing test,93 and the Ninth Circuit‘s
―objective effects‖ test94—each with its own advantages and
disadvantages.95
Oddly, the Court in Dukes applied the Fifth Circuit‘s incidental test
without formally adopting it or its underlying premise—predominance.
Instead, the Court flatly rejected the predominance concept on the grounds
that it was not in the Rule‘s text;96 it encouraged class representatives to
forego potentially valid monetary claims to maximize class certification97
and it required continual evaluation of class membership.98 Moreover, the
Court did not provide a comparative analysis of the three predominance
tests used by the circuit courts. This was a lost opportunity for the Court to
explain why the Fifth Circuit‘s incidental approach is superior to those of
the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Court adopted the most onerous test for
determining the propriety of monetary relief in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
without offering why this test trumped the others.99
91

The predominance test commonly applied in cases certified under Rule 23(b)(2) should not be
confused with the predominance test used in cases certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The question for Rule
23(b)(2) certification is whether monetary relief predominates over injunctive or declaratory relief. The
question for Rule 23(b)(3) certification is whether common issues predominate over individual ones.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
92
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 411, 415.
93
See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 162–64.
94
See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615–17.
95
See Malveaux, supra note 69 (describing advantages and disadvantages of each predominance
test).
96
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011). Moreover, the Court concluded
that the predominance analysis violated Rule 23‘s structure. Id. The Court reasoned that Rule
23(b)(3)—with its additional procedural protections—better accommodates monetary claims, and the
fact that such claims are non-predominant does not change this. See id.
97
Id. When structuring a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, class counsel may not seek all potentially valid
claims of monetary relief for fear that it will predominate over injunctive or declaratory relief. By doing
so, class counsel risks sacrificing the monetary relief not sought because individual class members may
be precluded from pursuing it under the collateral estoppel doctrine. In Dukes, this risk existed as to
compensatory damages, which were not pursued class-wide.
98
Id. at 2559–60. The Court‘s conclusion that ―[t]he predominance test would also require the
District Court to reevaluate the roster of class members continually,‖ id. at 2559, is overstated. Class
membership is fluid, often changing as members leave employment, die, or no longer fall within the
class definition. While the district court has the ongoing responsibility to ensure that class certification
remains appropriate, it is not responsible for micromanaging the litigation. Courts manage class actions
in broad strokes. Thus, the Court correctly noted that continual re-evaluation of class membership
would waste the district court‘s time. Id. at 2560. However, the Court‘s solution—―that the backpay
claims should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at all‖—overreaches. Id.
99
A comparative analysis of the three predominance approaches taken by the circuit courts is
beyond the scope of this paper. For an analysis of these approaches, see Malveaux, supra note 69, at
27–37.
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Third, the Court did not decide whether the absence of notice and a
right to opt out violates due process for a mandatory class action involving
monetary claims that do not predominate.100 In other words, the Court has
left unanswered the question posed in 1985 in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts.101 Rather than shut the door on this matter once and for all, the
Court left open a crack of doubt, concluding that there is a ―serious
possibility‖ that the absence of notice and an opt-out right ―may‖ violate
due process where monetary claims do not predominate.102 While on a
practical level the matter may be resolved, the loophole remains
unsatisfying.
The implications of this unanimous portion of the Dukes opinion are
mixed. On the one hand, the Court‘s ruling on back pay will make it more
difficult for employees alleging systemic misconduct under Title VII to
seek monetary relief. This is because it is now harder for plaintiffs to use
the Rule 23 provision designed for such cases—(b)(2). First, the Court
makes no distinction between equitable and non-equitable monetary relief
as a basis for Rule 23(b)(2) certification. This means that back pay—
normally favored because of its equitable nature—enjoys no preference
over compensatory and punitive damages sought under this class action
provision. Second, any monetary relief that is not incidental to the
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot survive Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
For those cases brought in the Second and Ninth Circuits, or in circuits that
have not ruled on the matter, a court must use the harshest standard
established for evaluating the availability of relief that is neither injunctive
nor declaratory.103 Third, courts are more likely to conclude that back pay
must be determined on an individual, rather than an aggregate, basis. The
individualized nature of the relief, in turn, makes it non-incidental, and thus
unavailable under the Rule 23(b)(2) provision.
Because of the more difficult certification standard under Rule
23(b)(2), employees may decide to seek only injunctive or declaratory
relief, or to forego bringing a Title VII class action altogether. For those
who seek certification under the alternative class action provision, Rule
23(b)(3), its more onerous burdens and costs may also foreclose aggregate
litigation. These outcomes risk underenforcement.
On the other hand, while Dukes may have made class certification
harder, it did not eliminate Title VII class actions. Employees bringing a
pattern-or-practice employment discrimination case involving monetary

100

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (link).
102
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
103
For an explanation of why the Second and Ninth Circuit approaches are preferable, see
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 27–37.
101
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relief can seek certification solely under Rule 23(b)(3)104 or a hybrid—
where injunctive or declaratory relief is sought under Rule 23(b)(2) and
monetary or individualized relief is sought under Rule 23(b)(3). This
approach gives employees notice of the litigation and the option of not
being part of a class whose cohesion is admittedly compromised by varied
monetary interests, thereby addressing any due process concerns.
Moreover, because Dukes eliminated predominance as a prerequisite for
injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs need not
cherry pick which monetary relief to pursue under the Rule to enhance class
certification. Plaintiffs can instead bring all of their claims for monetary
relief under Rule 23(b)(3).
Finally, given the very fact-specific nature of Dukes‘s back pay ruling,
it may have a limited impact on cases brought in other substantive areas and
under statutes other than Title VII.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Dukes has redefined the class certification requirements for
Title VII cases in ways that jeopardize potentially meritorious challenges to
systemic employment discrimination. Although the ultimate scope and
magnitude of Duke‘s impact is unclear, it is clear that Dukes has tipped the
balance in favor of powerful employers over everyday workers.

104
The dissent suggested as much. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting
that ―[a] putative class of this type may be certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3)‖ and reserving the matter for
consideration on remand).
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